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In this presentation, I will summarize the present status of the developments with a Universal
Theory of Relativity [1]. Some general challenges to be overcome will also be discussed.
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Newtonian physics is based on four basic con-
ceptions, namely, inertia, force, source of the force
and a law of motion. Inertia is the opposition of
a physical body to a change in its state of mo-
tion as perceived by an observer, the force is the
“cause” behind the motion of that physical body
and, since only another physical body can provide
such a cause of the motion, every physical body is
attributed an appropriate “source strength” as per
these conceptions. Gravitational mass and electro-
static charge are two such source characteristics
attributed to physical bodies.
Due to the mutual logical independencies of
these conceptions, a law of force has to be pos-
tulated in Newton’s theory. Similarly, numerical
values for inertia and source strength(s) are also
to be postulated or specified by hand and an in-
dependent statement for the law of motion is also
needed in Newton’s theory. It is only then that the
newtonian laws of motion predict the “path” of a
physical body that is imagined as a material point
of the Euclidean space which underlies the math-
ematical framework of Newton’s theory. In this
way, Newton’s mathematical framework makes a
contact with the physical world.
The classical/newtonian field theory too postu-
lates four, mutually logically independent, concep-
tions, equivalent to the aforementioned four, to ac-
count for the physical phenomena from fluid dy-
namics, electromagnetism etc.
Due to the mutual logical independencies of in-
volved conceptions, newtonian theories cannot, as
is well known, explain the origins of inertia and
the source characteristics (of forces) attributable
to physical matter. It is this same logical indepen-
dency of underlying conceptions that is also behind
“the equality of inertia and gravitational mass of
a physical body” being an assumption of Newton’s
theory. Still, newtonian theories explain a large
body of experimental results.
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To explain the experimental results, we then re-
quire four fundamental forces, viz, those of grav-
ity, electromagnetism, strong nuclear and weak nu-
clear interactions. Theoretical physicists, in gen-
eral, aim to explain these four interactions as aris-
ing from a single entity, ie, to unify these four
forces. Clearly, the “unification of the (fundamen-
tal) forces” must of course provide an appropriate
universal “explanation” which removes the mutual
logical independencies of these involved concepts
[1]. Evidently, this aim requires departures from
the newtonian framework.
The (orthodox) Quantum Theory replaces the
concept of force with that of a potential for the
force. (But, the source of potential in quantum
theory is the same as the source of the correspond-
ing newtonian force.) Schro¨dinger’s equation or
Heisenberg’s operators of the quantum theory ex-
plicitly involve only the potential generated by the
“source” of the force. So is the situation with the
procedure of second quantization - the creation,
the annihilation and the number operators all in-
volve the potential for the force.
The mathematical formalism of quantum the-
ory leads us only to probabilistic predictions about
physical phenomena. Issues of whether this prob-
abilistic description is any “complete” description
[2] of the physical reality or not are “separate” from
those of the mutual logical independencies of the
underlying physical concepts.
Regardless of other issues, the inertia, the po-
tential and the “source” for the potential are, once
again, mutually independent logical conceptions.
Also, an independent statement of the law of po-
tential has to be postulated in quantum theory.
Quantum theory too is then based on four mutu-
ally logically independent concepts.
Therefore, (methods of) quantum theory also
cannot explain the origins of the inertia and the
source characteristics (of potentials or forces) at-
tributable to physical matter. Then, faithful appli-
cations [3, 4] of mathematical methods of quantum
theory cannot lead us to the “true unification” of
the four fundamental interactions.
2That is to say, quantum theoretical methods
“postulate” the potentials corresponding to (ba-
sic) forces, but these methods cannot provide a
“single” explanation for those potentials, their the-
oretical framework being too narrow.
Now, Einstein’s principle of general relativity
states [5, 6] that the laws of physics must be appli-
cable with respect to all the systems of reference
[17]. This principle offers the widest permissible
conceptual basis for the entire physics.
To implement and also to test the usefulness
of the ideas behind this important principle, Ein-
stein proposed his “preliminary field equations” by
replacing only the concept of gravitational force
by that of the curvature of the spacetime geome-
try while treating all the other source character-
istics of physical matter (or equivalently, all the
non-gravitational forces) as forming the energy-
momentum tensor.
Although encouraged by the “initial successes”
of his field equations, Einstein was never comfort-
able [5, 6] with the fact that his field equations of
general relativity provided only a theory of gravity.
He never stated his (logical) reasons explicitly, but
the following illustrates the origins of Einstein’s
unease with his field equations.
Consider a statement: Every woman is replaced
by a flower. Clearly, it is then logically inconsis-
tent to replace Queen Cleopatra alone by a Ghost.
Needless to say, any statements about some ac-
tions of Queen’s Ghost and their consequences are
logically unacceptable to us, then.
Hence, the statement of a logically consistent
theoretical alternative to the newtonian framework
must be that the newtonian force is being replaced
by such and such conception, universally applicable
to every newtonian force.
[Quantum theory, for example, replaces every
force by its potential and is logically consistent in
this respect. Hence, methods of quantum theory
must be obtainable in a theory that “unifies” the
fundamental interactions because the methods of
the former are “universal” in replacing the force
by the corresponding potential.
Moreover, since quantum theory makes “proba-
bilistic” predictions, the relation of the quantum
theory with the theory that unifies the fundamen-
tal interactions can be expected [6] to be very sim-
ilar to that of the (usual) statistical physics with
the classical newtonian theory.]
Thus, replacing only one force, say, of gravity, by
curvature of geometry while considering all non-
gravitational interactions as forming the energy-
momentum tensor is logically unacceptable. But,
this is what Einstein equations are. Therefore, all
solutions of Einstein equations are then like differ-
ent actions of Queen’s ghost.
Hence, even if certain of the many solutions of
Einstein’s equations were to “equationally explain”
some observations of the real world, say, the bend-
ing of light, precession of the perihelion of Mer-
cury, gravitational redshift, changes in the period
of a binary pulsar system, cosmology etc, the “cur-
vature of geometry” is not any “logical reason” for
the involved physical phenomena.
To state it bluntly, some action of Queen’s Ghost
cannot be any acceptable “reason” for the falling
of an apple on Newton’s head even if this action
were to be always 1/r2. See Fig (1).
Also, if Queen’s ghost were to “dance” rhythmi-
cally holding the hand of matter, say, in the LIGO
detector then, some “wavy” motion of matter can
be “explained” even accurately. See Fig (2). This
however cannot form an explanation of the wavy-
motion of matter, even if such wavy motion is de-
tected by any detector [18].
Now, the basis of Einstein’s principle of general
relativity is the “equality” of all systems of ref-
erence, in relative acceleration or not, for the de-
scription of all physical phenomenon.
But, changes that can occur to the “physical
construction” of reference systems [7] must also
be the part of any such description. See Fig (3)
and Fig (4). The equality of the description of
physical phenomena must then hold incorporating
any possible physical changes to the constructions
of reference systems. This situation necessitates
“changes” also at the conceptual levels.
That is to say, the validity of the principle of
general relativity not only demands a mathemati-
cal framework that incorporates the physical con-
struction of reference systems but also demands
that we “redefine” various physical notions. I will
refer to this general theoretical framework [1] as
the Universal Theory of Relativity.
In [1], I had discussed a mathematical frame-
work of the theories of measures and dynamical
systems for this universal relativity. However, it
relied on certain physical observations which did
not, quite uniquely, fix the underlying mathemati-
cal structures, although the aforementioned logical
independencies were removable in it. It could then
be considered to be not sufficiently general and,
hence, not entirely satisfactory.
What, then, is the appropriate mathematical
formalism for the universal theory of relativity?
It is the contention here that the mathematical
framework of Category Theory [8, 9] is an appro-
priate basis for the universal relativity.
The rest of this paper constitutes a discussion
about the relevant mathematical notions [10, 11]
and how these notions could incorporate the ideas
of universal relativity. Of course, much more work
is still needed on various fronts.
3A partially ordered set (poset) P is complete iff
every subset of P has a lowest upper bound (lub
or sup or join) and a greatest lower bound (glb or
inf or meet). A poset P is then complete iff, as a
category, P has all limits and all co-limits.
A lattice is a poset having, as a category, all bi-
nary products and all binary co-products. A com-
plete lattice with an initial object 0 and a terminal
object 1 is a complete poset.
A Frame is a complete lattice in which binary
meet distributes over arbitrary joins. A Frame ho-
momorphism is a map between Frames preserving
finite meets and arbitrary joins. For any topologi-
cal space X , the lattice of its open sets, OX , forms
a Frame, ordered by set inclusion.
The correspondence X → OX is functorial with
the functor O : Top → Frm being a contravariant
functor, with Top being the category of topological
spaces and Frm being the category of Frames. Any
continuous map f : X → Y determines a Frame
homomorphism Of : OY → OX with Of(U) =
f− 1(U) for all U ∈ OY .
The Spectrum functor in the opposite direction
Σ : Frm → Top assigns to each Frame L its spec-
trum ΣL that is the space of all homomorphisms
ξ : L → 2, 2 being the 2-element lattice, with
each homomorphism being called a point of L, with
open sets Σa = {ξ ∈ ΣL|ξa = 1} for any a ∈ L. It
also assigns to each of the Frame homomorphisms
h : M → L a continuous map Σh : ΣL → ΣM
such that Σh(ξ) = ξh with (Σh)− 1(Σa) = Σh(a)
for any a ∈ M .
The two functors O and Σ are adjoint on the
right with the unit of this adjunction being denoted
by ηL and the co-unit by εX .
Frames for which ηL is an isomorphism are
called spatial. OX is trivially a spatial Frame.
Spaces for which εX is a homomorphism are
called the Sober Spaces. Category of Sober spaces
Sob is dually equivalent to the full subcategory of
SpFrm of spatial Frames.
Category opposite to Frm is called as the cat-
egory Loc of locales and it contains Sob as a full
subcategory. Category Loc is often used in the rel-
evant mathematical literature on pointless topol-
ogy which provides a wider basis than the usual
topological structure.
Next, a sheaf is [11] a “continuous set-valued”
function. A sub-sheaf of a sheaf F over a set X is
a sub-functor of F which is itself a sheaf. Sheaves
over a set X form the category Sh(X). Categorical
co-limits of finite limits in Sh(X) provide geometric
constructions which are point-wise and providing
sheaves. Category Sh(X) of sheaves over X then
contains an object - called the generic set - from
which every other object of Sh(X) can be geomet-
rically constructed.
When X is a topological space, sub-sheaves of
the terminal object of Sh(X) provide the open sub-
sets of X . When X are Sober spaces, continuous
maps between them are functors between the cor-
responding categories of sheaves preserving the ge-
ometric constructions.
This above provides [11, 12] a generalization of
a topological space - the generalized space of sets
- because the generic set is, in general, not iso-
morphic to the initial object of Sh(X), and the
sub-objects of the terminal object of Sh(X) not
necessarily its elements. Consequently, the notion
of “continuity” acquires, for example, a new mean-
ing in terms of the generic set.
Topos Theory was then developed [11, 13, 14,
15] based on a complete Cartesian closed category
with a sub-object classifier - a Topos. Also, the
differential structure built by giving up the Law of
Excluded Middle in the Euclidean setup leads to
Synthetic Differential Geometry [12].
Using a topos equipped with the notion of an
infinitesimal time-interval, it is then possible [13,
14, 15] to recast the newtonian framework into the
topos theoretic language. In [16], a wave equation
is also discussed from this point of view.
Physically, the construction of a reference sys-
tem must necessarily use physical bodies. For its
mathematical expression, we may consider a phys-
ical body as a collection of open subsets of some
topological space X [19]. Then, the physical con-
struction of a reference system is mathematically
representable as a Frame.
With the above identification, the category Frm
of Frames or, equivalently, the category Loc of lo-
cales could form the underlying mathematical ba-
sis for Universal Relativity. The category Sh(X)
would then be equally relevant. Issues regarding
the physical characteristics of material bodies will
then involve suitable measures over Frames. These
issues have not been addressed as yet.
Furthermore, the category Frm is not a Topos.
(There exist many other categories which are not
toposes.) Consequently, it is unclear whether the
Topos Theory could form a mathematical basis for
the universal relativity as it did [13] for the new-
tonian theoretical framework.
However, the notion of a category is very general
indeed and, hence, could form the basis for uni-
versal relativity. An important unanswered math-
ematical issue is then of defining an appropriate
notion of (generalized) measures in the general set-
ting of the category theory.
Notably, very general ideas from Physics and
Mathematics appear to become quite identical
here. Starting with the limited formalism in [1],
this is certainly a significant progress.
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5FIG. 1: Ghost causing physical motion
FIG. 2: Ghost causing Wavy Motion
FIG. 3: Physical construction of reference system
FIG. 4: Change to the physical construction of reference system as a physical phenomenon
